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Cet article fournit une revue critique de l'analyse institutionnaliste appliquée essentiellement par 
les tenants de la "social ecological economics" dans le domaine environnemental. Ce travail met 
l'accent à la fois les points forts et les points faibles de cette approche du point de vue analytique, 
en la confrontant à une taxonomie générale des institutionnalismes - largement utilisée en science 
politique et ici adaptée à l'économie. Cette démarche nous conduit à reconsidérer les objets de la 
social ecological economics sous le prisme d'une approche institutionnaliste historique des 
rapports sociaux à la nature. 
 








This paper provides a critical review of the ‘state of the art’ of institutional analysis applied 
essentially by social-ecological economists in the environmental domain. It highlights both areas 
of strength and issues where there is still room for improvement in analytical terms, by construing 
these approaches in the context of a general taxonomy of institutionalisms – widely used in 
politics and applied here in the economic realm. This provides the rationale for re-construing a 
number of related issues drawn from the core insights of a historical institutionalist approach to 
human-nature  
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It is right that what is just should be obeyed; it is necessary that what is strongest should be obeyed. Justice without force is helpless; force without 
justice is tyrannical. Justice without force is gainsaid, because there are always offenders; force without justice is condemned. We must then combine
justice and force and, for this end, make what is just strong, or what is strong just. Justice is subject to dispute; force is easily recognised and is not 
disputed. So we cannot give force to justice, because force has gainsaid justice and has declared that it is she herself who is just. And thus, being





In examining the intellectual economic context through which environmental issues are 
commonly approached, one would be hard put to avoid noting: 1) that money numbers and the 
capitalisation of nature are becoming increasingly predominant features since standard 
economists have found new grounds – including in the area of Ecological Economics (EE) – 
for extending the use of their framework; 2) the fragmented state of the heterodox 
‘community’. The chief motivation behind the initiative known as ‘Ecological Economics and 
Heterodoxies’
1
 was to develop convergences between the various schools that tend to reject 
standard analysis. One of the premises of this new field will be at the heart of this paper: 
institutional thought is well suited for supporting this aim and is in itself a productive program 
of applied research.  
A first step involves clarifying what is meant by ‘institutional thought’ in our context. 
Relating the purposes of an analysis to the demands of institutional thought is not a critical 
matter if it is assumed that all economic schools adhere to some extent to institutionalism, and 
even neoclassical  economics.
2 Furthermore, institutional approaches to the environment – 
which argue that ‘the idea that the economy is embedded in society… should influence the 
analysis of environmental issues’ (Røpke, 2005, p. 271) – still tend to be underrepresented by 
comparison with, say, monetary valuation. We target the historical approach as opposed to 
the rational and sociological approaches, insofar as the former exhibits the epistemological 
and methodological standpoints that are well-suited for developing the potential of a ‘socio-
economy of the environment and sustainability’ (Douai, 2008, 2009).  
Socio-economic approaches to the environment are currently being developed – 
essentially within Socio-Ecological Economics (SEE) – around three areas: 1) environmental 
conflicts, with the aim of demarcating ecological resources from the market; 2) environmental 
governance solutions; and 3) the general interpretation concerning sustainability. Our 
approach is based on a critical review of the unifying core of these approches, i.e. the 
development of an ethical-based socio-economy. SEE has had some success, for instance in 
making most scholars and decision-makers suspicious of efforts to value the environment in 
monetary terms. Yet SEE remains either silent or ambiguous when it comes to: 1) the 
structural causes of the global ecological crisis; 2) the notions of commodity, economic value 
and money; 3) the origins of institutional change; and 4) the interrelations between ecological 
issues and dynamic processes of political and economic transformation.  
The object of this paper is to lay the foundations of a framework that reconsiders the 
three areas identified above with a view to clarifying what should be required in analytical 
and conceptual terms for an inclusive heterodox approach of the four issues identified above. 
                                                 
1 Title of a workshop held at the 10
th Conference of the Association for Heterodox Economics in Cambridge (UK).    
2 Veblen was the first to employ the term ‘neoclassical’ to designate the authors committed to marginalism and to 
Marshallian thought… which he deemed to be at odds with the core principles of institutional analysis.  Institutions and the environment: the case for a historical political economy 
4 
 
This framework develops the core tenets of a historical institutionalist approach of 
environmental issues based on Classical Marxism and Regulation Theory. Its basic premise is 
that all human-nature relationships refer primarily to relations between humans themselves. 
Its social-historical problematization implies support for the relevance of the following 
features currently discussed in radical geography, environmental politics and economics as 
forming an ‘institutional political economy approach’  (Castree, 2008): 1) The structural-
logical contradiction inherent  in the use of nature for commodity production; 2) the 
expression of this  contradiction through historically  and  geographically localized social 
conflicts; and 3) both the co-existence of structural contradictions and stability in social 
relationships with nature and social conflict as visible challenges raise the question of how 
contradictions and conflicts (the latter interpreted in terms of the failure of existing 
institutions to contain underlying contradictions stemming from the historical-structural ways 
in which the economic process of valorization subsumes ecological entities and physical-
ecological laws) are effectively regulated over time. This implies a commitment to the 
regulation of social relationships with nature as the object of study emphasizing actors’ 
interests and power relations.  
Section 2 provides a critical review of the ethical-based socio-economy of the 
environment. Section 3 offers a cross-disciplinary taxonomy of institutional theories. Section 
4 outlines the core tenets of a historical institutionalist approach to social relationships with 
nature. Section 5 concludes.  
2. A critical review of the ethical-based socio-economy of 
the environment
3 
The first task is to provide an outline of the main philosophical and epistemological 
presuppositions of the ethical socio-economy of the environment before showing how they 
result in the disappearance of existing social relationships with nature.  
2.1. The presuppositions of the ethical-based socio-economy of the 
environment 
Environmental conflicts and the value of nature are at the heart of the divisions within 
EE between factions (in North America) that employ monetary valuation and SEE (especially 
in Europe, Spash, 2006). SEE rejects neoclassical monetary valuation methods (MVM) and 
promotes plural value articulation. The crucial areas of critique articulated by SEE concern: 1) 
the conception of human actors; 2) the social construction of actors’ values; and 3) the 
promotion of discursive institutions.  
 – An alternative view of the ‘valuing agent’. Two neoclassical postulates concerning 
human beings are rejected: 1) the existence of a coherent set of preferences that provide a 
uniform account of human behavior; 2) the exogeneity of these preferences. In contrast to 
these postulates, SEE emphasizes the existence of a plurality of ‘realms of values’ (Trainor, 
2006),  of ‘rationalities’  (Vatn, 2005a), of a ‘sphere of justice’ (Paavola, 2007), or of the 
‘incommensurability of values’ (O’Neill, 2004; Gowdy and Erickson, 2005). O’Neill and 
Spash (2000) claim that ‘an alternative view of values is that they express individual 
judgments about what is  legitimate or right and which are open to revision through 
                                                 
3 The purpose of this section is to clarify the ways in which SEE deals with the three objects of study cited above. For an 
overview of the cross-disciplinary application of institutional theories to environmental issues, see Hotimsky et al. (2006). Institutions and the environment: the case for a historical political economy 
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argument... A deontological view emphasises that consequences are not the only thing that 
matters’. SEE argues that ‘homo economicus is a construct which may certainly be adequate 
and fruitful for the analysis of many purely economic situations’, but this implies ‘limited 
perspectives on the relation of the human being with future generations or the relation of the 
human being with nature’ (Becker, 2006, p. 18).  
– The social construction of values. O’Neill (1997, p. 83) insists that ‘preferences that 
individuals have… cannot be taken as simply given. They have an institutional context. They 
emerge from…a set of social practices’. This leads Godard (2004, p. 139) and Vatn (2005a, p. 
210) to conclude, respectively, that MVM are ‘technical tool[s] for the construction of 
preferences, and that ‘[t]he type of institutions invoked in the process of expressing values 
influences both [those] that come forward and the conclusions that can be drawn on the basis 
of them.’ A Value Articulating Institution (VAI) is a ‘constructed set of rules’ that defines 
‘who shall participate and on the basis of which (…) role’ (Vatn, op. cit.). An important 
distinction needs to be drawn between choice as consumer and choice as citizen. Consumer 
behaviour is not a constitutive component of an actor’s identity: ‘his preferences are those of a 
person over one of his social roles’ (Godard, 2004a, p. 147).
4 When the ‘common good’ is at 
stake, ‘[p]olicy-makers need to call upon other [VAI] that will allow individuals to express 
their values in an appropriate manner’ (O’Neill and Spash, 2000, p. 541).  
– The need for discursive institutions (DI). Vatn (2005b, p. 163) argues that since the 
‘institutional setting influences which preferences and values in the continuum from ‘I’ and 
‘We’ are found to be acceptable and/or relevant’; an important ‘choice for society is to decide 
which institutional system should be in place for which type of problem’. DI are seen as tools 
for achieving agreement or consensus at the crossroads of the different logics or values to 
which the different parties are committed. As Godard puts it, ‘the aim is to find the level of 
reality in which antagonisms between individuals are suppressed for making consensus or 
harmony possible’. This is based largely on Habermas’s model of dialogue. As O’Neill (1997, 
p. 84-5) explains, a distinction is to be made between the ‘model of negotiation’ and the ‘model 
of reasoned dialogue’. The former is appropriate where there exist conflicts of interests, ‘not 
judgments’. [Its] aim is not to converge on an agreed judgment, but to arrive at some modus 
vivendi, a compromise, that allows individuals with quite different interests to operate in a 
common world.’ The environmental conflict is open to ‘reasoned adjudication’, to a more 
disinterested, free and honest dialogue aiming at convergence. SEE sometimes emphasizes the 
normative character of this task:  
It is important to distinguish between positive and normative claims. [N]ot everyone may approach environmental
issues in [an ethical way]… But the fact that people do not always [e.g.,] vote in pursuit of the public good is not an
argument against the normative claim that they should do so; that thinking about public goods from a ‘citizen’ 
perspective is what membership of a political community… ought primarily to be about… The institutions proposed 
here are based on a normative political theory, that of deliberative democracy. (Jacobs, 1997, p. 214-5 & 228).   
SEE and Godard argue that this approach is feasible if ‘we consider that actors engaged 
in a conflict are not attached in an identary manner to their [values or logics, etc.], but that 
they have the property of moving through this pluralist space’. O’Neill questions the claim 
that consensus is always achievable: the ‘ideal dialogue’ may succeed in arriving not at 
                                                 
4 A host of empirical observations that show that respondents in the context of contingent valuation (CV) may not wish to 
and often fail to conform to the assumptions of the rational choice model has been accumulated. For SEE, this proves the 
existence of ethical limits to commodification (Spash, 2008).  Protest responses in terms of willingness to pay or accept (very 
high individual bids, state a zero bid, or refuse to bid at all) are interpreted as proofs that ‘[individuals express] the opinion 
that the environment is not well represented by economic value’ (Svedsäter, 2003, p. 123). As O’Neill and Spash (2000, p. 
528) state, ‘to put a price on an object has a cultural meaning: it can be felt as an act of betrayal of a moral commitment’.   Institutions and the environment: the case for a historical political economy 
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agreement, but at each party appreciating the reasonableness of the opposing view while 
remaining committed to his or her own view’ (op. cit.). This open-mindedness may be seen as 
depending on what Paavola (2007) refers to as ‘procedural justice’ in the absence of 
‘distributive justice’.  
Paavola argues that this framework helps to reconsider the nature of environmental 
governance (EG)  solutions.  His  reconceptualization of EG is designed to take account of 
multi-level solutions and of all kinds of ecological resources.
5  EG  is  defined as ‘the 
establishment, reaffirmation or change of institutions to resolve conflicts [of interests] over 
environmental resources’ (p. 94). Resolving them requires defining ‘whose interests are to 
prevail and to what degree’, which ‘is not an issue of efficiency, but of distribution’. He 
insists that the ‘choice of governance institutions is a matter of social justice rather than of 
efficiency’: ‘legitimate [EG] decisions... have to reflect both distributive and procedural 
justice concerns’ (p. 96). The second type operates in fact as a counterweight to dilemmas 
implied by the first:  
In the context of pluralism, distributive justice matters in a broad sense of whose interests and values will be realized by
the establishment, change or affirmation of [EG] institutions. [Pluralism] may entail different governance solutions for
the pursuit of differents goals Yet the dilemmas of distributive justice will remain difficult to resolve. Procedural justice
plays a role in justifying decisions to those whose interests and values are sacrificed to realize some other interests and 
values. It can also facilitate learning and transformation of values and motivations of involved actors (p. 97).    
The core concerns of procedural justice are: whose interests are recognized and how? 
Which parties can participate and how? What constitutes an effective distribution of power? The 
relative power of the involved parties then ‘determines to which extent they can make their 
interests count’. Distributive justice therefore concerns the issue of whose interests will be 
realized, while procedural justice concerns the effective distribution of power. The claim that 
the choice of EG institutions ‘is a matter of social justice’ may be viewed with a degree of 
scepticism. If EG implies that some ‘interests and values are sacrificed to realize some other 
interests’ and that the choice of EG institutions is determined by the relative power of the 
involved parties, then ought we not to consider that: 1) EG is first of all a matter of power 
accumulation; and 2) that it calls for effective procedural justice –  thereby ensuring that ‘the 
interests which are not endorsed by a particular environmental decision can count in other 
decisions’, and that the affected parties can ‘express their consent or dissent, and maintain 
their dignity’ – as the means for making what is strong just or more legitimate? This has 
implications for the way in which the object of institutional analysis is defined. Paavola 
argues that:  
Institutional analysis should examine central institutional rules of governance functions because their formulation has 
implications for transaction costs and distributive, procedural and governance outcomes… In practice, institutional 
analysis has to analyze and compare the implications of alternative rule formulations and institutional designs that could
be or could have been applied to the governance problem at hand.    
Yet what of the following issues: which interests and strategies tend to prevail? How do 
the involved actors or parties work politically to establish institutions that are favourable to 
them, i.e. that imply the recognition and protection of their interests and the denial of others? 
In other words, how do the involved parties work toward becoming hegemonic, in the sense of 
the capacity to persuade other actors to accept a compromise? How might these institutions 
appear to the actors to constitute objective and inherent constraints?  We will return to this 
point in due course.  
                                                 
5 Interdisciplinary research sheds light on the conditions in which ‘voluntary collective action’ attain sustainable governance 
environmental resources’ and has identified ‘design principles of successful governance solutions’ (p. 93). Institutions and the environment: the case for a historical political economy 
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The final approach discussed here is the Polanyi-inspired account of the ecological crisis 
described by Adaman et al. (2003). This approach tends to be holistic and historical-oriented, 
as illustrated by the following judgment concerning SEE and the general programmatic appeal 
formulated by Adaman and Özkaynak (2002):  
Although the [Institutional school] has elaborated suggestions regarding environmental issues, it has not yet fully
considered the operation of the socio-economic system as a whole. Readers… may find it difficult to see how decisions 
on environmental issues might be incorporated into the overall picture…  
[T]he definition and the scope of environmental issues and the ways in which they should be approached and treated
should be conceptualised at the social level… [O]nly a holistic methodology will enable the researcher to take full
account of the complexity and multidimensionality of social and economic structures and natural systems and their
dynamic interactions.   
Polanyi’s thesis, outlined in The Great Transformation (1943), is thus endorsed. In his 
study of the nineteenth-century economy, Polanyi showed how the rise of capitalism served to 
destroy feudal social relations and social and natural habitats, thus providing an account of the 
degree of violence implied by the process of ‘disembedding’: the capitalist market system 
‘reinstituted the economy as a separate and distinct sphere, with its own logic and laws of 
motion, disembedding it from society and nature by creating markets for labour, land and 
money’ (Adaman et al., 2003, p. 362).
6 Yet ‘disembedding can never be complete since 
laissez-faire economic liberalism undermines the conditions necessary for continuous capitalist 
reproduction and calls forth movements of resistance’ that Polanyi (1957, p. 180) referred to 
as the ‘self-protection of society’. He therefore interpreted nineteenth-century history as the 
result of a ‘double movement’ (at the national level) of an expansion of liberated markets for 
real commodities and of a limitation concerning fictious commodities, i.e. ‘a conflict between 
the market and the elementary requirements of an ordered social life’. This background is 
used to define claims for ecological sustainability as a concrete manifestation of this double 
movement, as the need to ‘reinstitute… [the economy] in ways that bring it under social 
control’ (Adaman et al., 2003, p. 357). 
Two related comments are in order here, though we would not wish to imply that they 
apply entirely to Adaman et al. They are inspired from comments made by Brand and Görg 
(2001) concerning the Polanyi-inspired account of neo-liberal globalization to which Adaman 
(2005) positively refers and for which Adaman et al. use the term ‘deregulation’. 1) One 
important matter is the role of the political content of processes such as globalization and 
sustainability. While Polanyi postulated the existence an enforced ‘self-regulating market’, he 
also emphasized its political content. The re-regulation/re-embedding imagery may tend to 
disguise or underestimate the fact that even ‘liberated’ markets ‘have to be established and 
enforced, … by the transformations of the existing social relations and thus by political 
activity in a broader sense’ (Brand and Görg, p. 72). Adaman et al. draw a distinction between 
‘institutedness’ and ‘embeddedness’: ‘institutedness’ appears to imply that economic activity 
is a kind of social-political process. Here we may ask what it means to ‘seek ways of 
[re]embedding the economy in society’ and to figure the economy and society separately in a 
schema, if we consider that capitalism, construed as a contradictory process, invariably 
requires a web of political and socio-cultural institutions to guarantee its stabilization, i.e. that 
capitalism is invariably embedded in some sense. The answer refers to embeddedness within 
‘organic’ or ‘comprehensive’ social relations – ‘a moral economy’ as emphasized by 
Thomson (1980), or more practically, the development of political and socio-cultural 
institutions through which ‘civil society [would] exercise [a] control’. While the notion of the 
                                                 
6 These latter are called ‘fictious commodities’, i.e. things whose socio-cultural value, physical function, or biological needs 
exceed that which is registered through market transactions of discrete commodities. By treating them as if they are true 
commodities the capitalist system is contradictory. Institutions and the environment: the case for a historical political economy 
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loss of collective power along with the emergence of the capitalist market system may be 
relevant, this analytical framework may tend to neglect the social-political construction of 
markets and of the never-ending process of (re-)articulation of economics and politics in 
which conflicting interests and power relations come to the fore. 2) A key point is the 
Polanyi-inspired account of conflicts in terms of the ‘self-protection of society’. Even if 
movements of resistance are by nature political, this view is based on a ‘functionalist concept 
of society’. Polanyi (1957, p. 223) observes: ‘In the final analysis things were set in motion by 
the interests of the entire society, even if their defense originally fell more to one than to 
another part of the population. It thus appears to us to be appropriate not to gear our report of 
the protective movement to class interests but to the social substance threatened by the 
market’. The view of capitalist society as a contradictory process and the emphasis on 
conflicts and their regulation (even if Polanyi does refer to this) are thus abandoned. Society 
is viewed as a ‘functional whole’ driven by a sole interest: to harmonize all of its spheres in 
order to prevent any single sphere from becoming destructively independent.  
The danger in analytical terms – the unifying feature of the reviewed approaches – 
would be to construe sustainability as a particular model pursued and achieved jointly by the 
various actors, provided the appropriate incentives or political and socio-cultural institutions 
are made available, i.e. arenas in which the particular interests and power relations from which 
actors would step away for the sake of an objective goal. As soon as the identification of 
social conflicts between various actors aiming at markedly different goals is made to become 
the pre-analytical vision, the view suffers from a neglect of: 1) the primary motive forces of 
institutional genesis and change in many contexts and at different levels; and 2) the connection 
between ecological issues and socio-economic processes. 
2.2. Between power and morality: the decline of social relationships 
with nature 
SEE consciously neglects the role of objective conditions or social structures within 
which values or intersubjectivities are embedded, of power relations and of political 
compromises – the latter understood as an arbitration process between heterogeneous 
interests, which reflects neither the requirements of economic efficiency nor those of an ethical 
imperative, but reflects instead an autonomous logic of power accumulation. Indeed, although 
there are some references to these issues, nonetheless SEE either tends to treat them as 
second-order concerns or ignores them altogether in cases where environmental conflicts are 
the object of the analysis. Yet a number of caveats have been raised. Holland (2002, p. 33) 
observes that:   
[C]riticism [of discursive institutions] will focus on the effects of the uneven distributions of power, confidence… that 
will apply to any given context of deliberation. Results may be inconclusive, contradictory, or irrelevant… democratic
principles imply a right to be considered; but they do not imply a right to count or to determine the outcome.   
O’Neill (1997) seeks to draw a distinction between conflicts of interests and conflicts of 
judgments, thus drawing a further distinction between negotiation and reasoned dialogue, yet 
he writes:  
[A] certain wariness needs to be exercised in writing as if ideal speech situation already existed. Environmental
conflicts are not only about values, they are also about power and interests [Footnotes: To that extent there is something 
to Sen’s comment on Elster’s version of Habermas: ‘it is not really easy to see how antagonistic interests, including
class interests would all get submerged in “unanimous preferences” merely by a “rational discussion”’]. The two are in
tension (…).   Institutions and the environment: the case for a historical political economy 
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A little earlier, O’Neill had claimed that the model of negotiation is appropriate where 
there is a conflict of interests, and is not appropriate in ‘the cases of conflict which [he] ha[s] 
outlined’. He now claims that environmental conflicts are not merely matters of judgment, but 
are also issues of power and interests. No particular attention is paid to the tension between 
values and interests. He observes later that ‘[t]he association of evaluative practices  with 
positions of social power and wealth induces quite proper scepticism about their reliability’. In 
fact, the sphere of values and social structures are ontologically opposed. For him this calls for 
‘a political epistemology concerning conditions of trust, and a corresponding social and 
political theory about its institutional preconditions’. O’Neill (1993, chapter 8) deals with 
trust between scientific expertise and individuals from the perspective of moral philosophy. 
His inquiry leads him to reiterate his support for deliberation as a means of to solving a 
problem arising from it, thereby creating a sense of circularity in the argument:  
Through common deliberation, the citizens may show better sense than the best of individuals. Such common deliberation
is a necessity in the modern world. Given that a variety of knowledge and practices inform many choices, it is only
through such common deliberation that rational policy is possible.    
As such the relation between science and society constitutes a relevant subject matter. 
Yet its treatment via normative political theory hardly exhausts what is at stake analytically if 
SEE seeks simultaneously to take account of the reality of the social world and to promote 
discursive institutions. If there is a tension, it is between these two modes of thinking.  
The work of Vatn (2005b) typically illustrates this ambiguity. The first part of his book 
deals with institutional change. Vatn defines institutions as the set of ‘conventions, norms and 
sanctioned rules of a society [which] provide expectations, stability (…), regularize life, 
support values and produce and protect interests’ (p. 60). Concerning institutional change, 
Vatn identifies two approaches: 1) the efficiency-based account of standard analysis; and 2) a 
view concerning the protection of specific interests. He cites the example of the interpretation 
of the effects of the green revolution in the Philippines in terms of yield distribution. The 
green revolution increased yields that were distributed in accordance with the rules of existing 
share tenancy. For Hayami and Ruttan (1985) this created a degree of disequilibrium between 
marginal costs and productivity. The observed shifts in the labour payment system are 
interpreted by the authors as a means of restoring a degree of equilibrium. Vatn (p. 183) 
responds thus:  
The difficulty with th[is] type of explanations is that distribution is the result of some natural forces – the correction of 
some externally forced disequilibrium. [It] is not ‘nature’, but institutional arrangements that define what is income and
what is a cost and for whom. The explanation of the institutional change is based on concepts that are themselves 
defined by the given institutional setting. No neutral point exists and, as we … see, the change can be better explained
with reference to the power implied by given rights structures.    
Vatn’s comment reflects the view that ‘what becomes efficient is defined by the interests 
protected by the collective via the formulated institutions’ (p. 170), notably the state. He also 
refers to Schmid’s account of the role of economics in this matter:  
There is no theoretical reason that [the landless labor] cannot be beneficiaries of public investments in irrigation 
and new plant varieties as well as landlords and original tenants… This ideology [that of natural equilibrium],
masked as a science, is part of the power struggle used by different groups to obtain institutions favorable to 
them. There is no way to have welfare economics that does not require the taking of sides (emphasis added).    
Vatn (p. 185-190) concludes that: 1) ‘power… may be built into the basic structures of 
society – the institutions – like access to resources and the rules defining the distribution of 
surplus’. In this sense, ‘the differences between old and modern societies is not only that of Institutions and the environment: the case for a historical political economy 
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democratization…, but also of converting visible and brute force execution into more hidden – 
that is, institutionally hidden – ones’; 2) as soon as conflicts are involved:   
The vey concept of efficiency, the rules and conventions by which efficiency is measured, are themselves largely 
defined by the actual institutional set-up… The efficiency claims become embedded in the assumptions of the analysis.
We therefore have to accept that whatever institutional structure is formed, it implies the recognition and protection of
some interests and the denial of others. Certainly the capacity of different interests to secure their protection by these
institutional structures varies. Partly the relevant social groups may lack the political or other necessary power.   
To summarize, as soon as conflicts are involved: (1) an institution regulates a conflict, 
and tends to ‘normalize’ it or to make it ‘invisible’; (2) it implies the recognition of some 
interests and the denial of others; (3) it is not natural, neutral and immortal; (4) it is a 
condensation of power relations; (5) criteria of efficiency reflect the interests of those 
occupying advantageous positions; and (6) ideas (theorems, philosophical positions…) 
provide ideological support and are part of the power struggle between different groups to 
obtain institutions that are favourable to them.  
Yet the environmental conflict is not concerned by this analysis (p. 303): 
[S]ince ‘what is good’ (‘efficient’) is a function of the institutional systems, choices about institutional reform must lie
beyond those of individual preferences and technical efficiency. It is a second-order issue concerning which interests 
and values society should protect… [T]he choice of institutions must be based on arguments… about what sort of
society we want to foster. The objectivist perception of ‘what is best’ offers the opportunity to do such evaluations. 
Choosing between [VAI] implies choosing between rationalities and values… it becomes inconsistent to use the
evaluative logic of one institutional structure – private property and markets – to evaluate outcomes from another 
institutional system.   
The normative premises expressed marginally in the case of economic relations – ‘What 
then is a legitimate use of power?’; ‘The problem we face… is on what grounds can an 
interest be said to be legitimate’ – now become central. The concept of legitimacy becomes 
crucial. Two cases are possible: 1) legitimacy – the normative aspect of any institution – refers 
to power relations, as Vatn argues in the case of economic relations. Following Lordon 
(2007), we then need to consider that: (i) all of the interests involved in conflicts are 
legitimate for those who support them; (ii) any criteria of goodness serve and reflect the 
interests of dominating groups. Other groups may lack the political or other necessary powers 
to impose their interests, and/or dominating groups use a symbolic power to be hegemonic; 
(iii) assuming a position concerning the legitimacy of such and such an interest or of such and 
such a use of power is the expression either of the adhesion to some parties or of a moral 
judgment.  
2) Legitimacy is related to ethics, in a framework in which individuals are primarily 
motivated by the fairness of their actions, and in which their values are the driving factors of 
institutional change. This option amounts first of all to conflating politics with ethics, the 
former viewed as a space of convergence between values, and secondly to overlooking the 
role of interests and power relations.  
Vatn hesitates between the first position – typical of Historical Institutionalism – and the 
second position – typical of Sociological Institutionalism. He refers to environmental conflicts 
and the choice of institutions as a ‘second-order issue’. It might have been assumed that his 
normative positions would thus be made clear, the latter being clearly distinguished from ‘first-
order issues’ concerning environmental conflicts, i.e. their conceptual connection to the 
dynamics of the social world for analyzing their structure and regulation. Yet environmental 
conflicts and the dynamics of the social world remain unrelated, and the hope invested in the 
primacy of the common good is seen as a specific analytical stance.  Institutions and the environment: the case for a historical political economy 
11 
 
The general approach of Vatn can be outlined as follows. In the context of capitalist 
relations or economic order, the main drivers of institutional change are interests and power 
relations. Environmental conflicts are located at the crossroads of several orders, thus raising 
the issue of the incommensurability of values. A useful step for avoiding the ‘intra-order’ 
drivers is to transfer the environment into the sphere of the common good: ‘The problem with 
the standard position is that it involves the logic of markets without asking whether this is the 
perspective which is appropriate when analyzing common goods’ (2005a, p. 209). Like all 
other logics or orders, the common good has its proper institutional system (2005b, p. 226) – 
that of the ideal forms of deliberative democracy – and is supported by an objective vision of 
the good: ‘what is good can be evaluated in objective terms – that is, accepting that one 
argument can be evaluated as better than another in the public domain’ (p. 363). Note that 
Vatn previously adhered to Schmid’s idea that ‘[t]here is no way to have welfare economics 
that does not require the taking of sides’… In the logic of the common good the relevant role 
of the actor is to be a citizen: a person can be asked ‘to step out of [his] position [in society]’ 
and his goal is to ‘create consensus’, i.e. an agreement concerning judgments and values 
which is facilitated by actors’ capacity to transform their preferences and values (p. 354-5).  
Vatn seeks to respond to those who argue that his presupposition concerning actors and 
the role of politics is merely a ‘naïve ideal’, i.e. that it overlooks the role of ‘strategic 
manipulation’ and that agreement comes about as a result of ‘the premises of some powerful 
actors’.  Vatn  argues  that: 1)  ‘dialogue  in  itself discourages strategic behaviour’ and 
‘accentuates the focus on the common good’; 2) several ‘remedies are available to strengthen 
the internal drivers of communication towards neutralizing specific interests, (…) [m]eetings 
may be explicitly defined as public, and socially weak groups may be given special support so 
that their voice might be heard’. But if individuals are oriented towards an ideal of justice, 
why should we support socially weak groups, and against whom or what? Nothing in these 
arguments provides an answer to Holland: ‘democratic principles imply a right to be 
considered, but they do not imply a right to count or to determine the outcome’. To speak of a 
‘dialogue in itself’ in reference to Habermas is highly debatable. There is no dialogue in itself 
that is external to a systemic perspective. In Habermas’s theory of ‘communicative action’, 
power  relations are excluded; actors are motivated by creating and maintaining the 
fundamental condition of symmetry between interlocutors; the force of arguments is 
antinomic with the power of interests and is the only issue that counts. SEE is keen to support 
communicative action and to take account of the role of power relations and interests, which 
is impossible. If the latter are inscribed in language, as Holland  argues, then there is no 
dialogue that is external to power relations and symbolic violence.  
Our aim is not specifically to underline the idealism or wrongness of the moral approach 
to conflicts, a claim that would at any rate make little sense. The point is that it implies an 
internal contradiction, as well as questionable analytical premises. The contradiction is the 
following: the environmental conflict concerns the conflict between different logics or orders. 
The assumption is that the involved actors accept on this occasion the primacy of a ‘general 
interest’, while they are simultaneously embedded in logics or orders  in which private 
interests and power relations are the motive force of activity. Yet this amounts to assuming 
that  the  democratic order  –  along with the underlying presuppositions concerning human 
actors and the role of politics – is already present and operational within the involved logics or 
orders. The issue here is to know how the compatibility between the stance of value pluralism 
and the quest for the common good can possibly be defended. There are two possibilities: 1) 
either actors are primarily motivated by the common good, in which case the democratic order 
is everywhere, i.e. present and operational within all specific logics. In this case, Vatn ought to 
abandon his entire analysis of institutional change based on diverging private interests and Institutions and the environment: the case for a historical political economy 
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power relations, and to accept that the problem of the incommensurability of values is solved, 
within the framework of SEE, merely through ad hoc assumptions concerning actors and the 
role of dialogue; 2) or Vatn persists in his analysis of institutional change based on interests 
and power relations, in which case the promotion of deliberative institutions has no other 
basis but a normative concern for keeping nature away from markets, or for ensuring that 
conflicts do not end ‘in a war’ (p. 354).  
However praiseworthy this concern may be, from an analytical perspective, it lends 
support to principles that tend to displace the object of study from an analysis following 
certain findings of SEE concerning the role of interests and power relations. Environmental 
conflict, governance and sustainability cannot be simply related to the sphere of values, to a 
matter of individual ethical orientations. These are spaces of conflicts between divergent 
interests that are defined by the positions occupied by actors within the social structure, and 
which are supported by normative values, the latter themselves related to objective social 
conditions. Vatn ought to have based his analysis of environmental issues on his own claim 
that ‘institutions  structure the relationships between  humans as they utilize  their  common 
natural base’ (p. 14). He might then have argued that property rights, firms and the state – the 
examples he uses to illustrate his analysis in terms of power – simultaneously serve to 
structure relationships between humans and their relationships with nature. The treatment of 
environmental conflicts  merely  through the lens of normative values results in the 
disappearance of social relationships with nature, and in the impossibility of construing these 
conflicts as manifestations of contradictions inherent in these relations. The position of an 
ethical-based socio-economy amounts to denying that all human-nature relations concern 
relationships between humans themselves.  
SEE is thus rendered inoperative with regard to: 1) the structural accounts of the global 
ecological crisis; 2) the meaning of the concepts of commodity, economic value and money, 
which constitute the very core of neoclassical economic valuation. SEE is unable to perceive 
that MVM is, like the rules of equilibrium concerning revenues, the ideological superstructure 
that supports the growing commodification of nature; and so cannot perceive itself as a part of 
the power struggle used by different groups; and 3) the interrelations between ecological 
issues and socio-economic dynamics.  
The epistemological and methodological standpoints required to develop a more 
comprehensive socio-economic approach to environmental issues remain an open question. 
We argue that Historical Institutionalism provides some broad guidelines for addressing this 
issue. The following section presents a taxonomy of institutionalisms that have flourished in 
recent years within the social sciences with a view to making a first step toward 
demonstrating this point and to position the ethical socio-economy of the environment on the 
related ‘map’. 
3. A taxonomy of institutionalisms 
As noted above, the near totality of schools of thought in economics describe themselves 
as institutionalist. An outline of their main differences is in order. In its broadest sense, an 
institution refers to the set of rules, beliefs, ways of thought, habits and customs that guide the 
behaviour of individuals forming a group. The core issues relate to the mediations between 
humans and social structures, and the way in which institutions guide agents’ behaviour while 
being simultaneously actualized by it (Billaudot, 2004). Clear divergences appear with respect 
to 1) relationships between institutions and behaviour; 2) processes governing the emergence, 
reproduction and transformation of institutions emerge. In this regard, Hall and Taylor (1996) Institutions and the environment: the case for a historical political economy 
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draw a distinction between Rational Institutionalism (RI), Sociological Institutionalism (SI) 
and Historical Institutionalism (HI). Figure 1 arranges these approaches, along with some of 
their chief ‘representatives’ – New Institutional Economics (NIE), Convention Economics 
(CE), Old Institutionalism (OI, American and European) and Regulation Theory (RT) – based 
on their conception of institutions and rationality. Table 1 provides a summary of their key 
differences. 



































Table 1. The three types of institutionalisms and their main differences 
 
3.1. Rational Institutionalism (RI)
7  
RI includes mainstream-inspired approaches of institutions that focus essentially on 
property rights, rent-seeking and transactions costs. Like other general approaches, it contains 
some variations. Following Hall and Taylor (1996) and Billaudot (2004), four features can be 
emphasized.    
                                                 
7 The taxonomy elaborated by Hall and Taylor (1996) stems mainly from political science. They use the expression ‘Rational 
Choice Institutionalism’ (RCI) and refer in a footnote to the ‘new institutionalism’ in economics which ‘overlaps heavily 
[with RCI]’. Billaudot (2004) uses ‘Rational Institutionalism’. In Hall and Taylor (1996), ‘new institutionalism’ covers all 
three different analytical approaches (RCI, SI, HI) that have appeared in political science over the past 15 years. Institutions and the environment: the case for a historical political economy 
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–  Behavioural assumptions. The behavior of actors is driven not by impersonal 
historical forces but by a strategic calculus, itself based on a universal and natural economic 
rationality. The capacities of actors are infinite and have fixed, perfectly identifiable and 
exogenous objectives (except in the works of North) that are troubled to some extent by 
beliefs, customs, etc.   
–  The ‘raison d’être’ of institutions.  The  social  field  is a set of  collective action 
dilemmas, prisoner’s dilemma, or tragedies of the commons in which individuals’ calculus 
produce collectively sub-optimal outcomes as a result of transaction costs and information 
asymmetries. The absence of institutional arrangements prevents the achievement of an 
optimal outcome. They are conceived as constraints or second-best solutions to coordination 
problems. As soon as institutions are designed as a consequence of strategic calculus, they 
solve coordination problems (the spontaneous order of Hayek), although they are generally 
sub-optimal if they emerge as a result of the actions of the state. 
–  Institutions-behaviour relationships. The strategic calculus of actors includes 
expectations concerning other actors’ behaviour. Institutions structure such interactions: they 
affect (positively or negatively for the actor) the range of alternatives on the ‘choice-agenda’ 
and provide information or mechanisms that reduce uncertainty in the context of strategic 
interaction; they also allow ‘gains from exchange’.  
– Institutional genesis, reproduction and change. RI is ‘functionalist’, i.e. ‘it explains 
the origins of an institution largely in terms of the effects that follow from its existence’. Their 
persistence relates to the value, for the actors, of the functions which they perform. The 
institution is thus created by the actors affected – ‘intentionalism’ and ‘voluntarism’ through 
mutual agreement – i.e. the gains from cooperation, and the institution persists as long as 
alternative institutional forms do not provide more benefits. The refinements of neoclassical 
theory, such as those achieved with game theory, have helped to improve the realism of its 
models – e.g. market failures that cannot be understood based on usual assumptions (perfect 
information, absence of strategic interactions). RI is able to account for institutional genesis in 
simple cases corresponding to a Nash or perfect equilibrium in an evolutionary game (Aoki, 
2001). Yet at least three criticisms can be levelled against it: 1) a high-level of functionalism: 
institutions emerge for the purposes of resolving economic problems, yet this is not the case: 
neither a belief in God nor trust aim are designed to resolve this problem, even if they may 
have an impact on economic issues; 2) RI implies questionable assumptions about actors and 
their rationality. The actors involved control institutional creation and are perfectly able to 
perceive the effects in terms of gains; the purpose of the institution is precisely to secure these 
gains. The absence of any historical perspective – except in North (1990) and Greif (1998), 
although in highly specific terms – explains these ‘heroic assumptions’ (Hall and Taylor, 
1996); 3) the high-level of voluntarism makes the role of power relations invisible and 
overlooks the fact that we come to life in a world where there are already institutions which 
we have to learn about. Institutional creation is viewed as a contractual process marked by 
voluntary agreement among equal and independent actors. Although it may reflect some 
simple cases, it tends nonetheless to underestimate ‘the degree to which asymmetries of power 
vests some actors with more influence than others over the process of institutional creation’ 
(Hall et Taylor, 1996, p. 321). Institutions and the environment: the case for a historical political economy 
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3.2. Sociological Institutionalism (SI) 
SI is represented in sociology by organization theory and in economics by the French 
CE and a range of culturalist approaches.
8 There are many variations in these approaches. 
Following Hall and Taylor (1996) and Billaudot (2004), four features can be emphasized to 
clarify the exact nature of SI.  
–  Definition of institutions. SI broadly defines institutions to include formal rules, 
procedure, norms, symbols systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates that provide the 
‘frames of meaning’ that shape human action. Compared with HI, SI lays greater emphasis on 
informal institutions: culture includes not merely shared values, but also routines and symbols 
that shape behaviours and therefore constitute institutions.   
– Institutions-behaviour relationships. Institutions constitute both social norms and 
cognitive structures. They are associated with specific roles to which specific values or norms 
are attached. Individuals socialized into these roles internalize these values and behave, 
through interpretation, in accordance with these norms. The cognitive dimension implies that 
institutions shape behaviour by providing cognitive structures and models that are 
indispensable for action since they provide expectations, stability and meaning essential for 
human existence and coordination.  
– Behavioural assumptions. SI is thus influenced by social constructivism, but often 
rejects any form of holism that tends to negate the freedom of the actor: humans 
simultaneously influence and are influenced by institutions. The notions of subjectivity and 
interpretation are central: faced with a particular situation, an actor needs to find ways to 
understand and respond appropriately. The symbols and practices of the institutional world 
provide the means for this process: the actor works with and reworks the available 
institutional templates to devise a course of action. The approach is comprehensive and rests 
on the assumption of a socialized actor: individuals internalize routines and values and act 
according to their interpretation of rules. This does not imply that they are not ‘interested’. 
Rationality is shaped by institutions and the interests toward which an actor is striving are 
generally conceptualized in broader terms, e.g. justice, altruism, etc. (even if most 
sociological institutionalists are reluctant to refer to individual interests): ‘actors (…) are more 
driven by concerns for doing what is institutionally acceptable and culturally appropriate than 
by some kind of cost-benefit analysis’ (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991).   
– Institutional genesis, reproduction and change. Actors or organizations often adopt 
new symbols, practices or rules since these tend to enhance their social legitimacy. The 
question of what confers legitimacy – i.e. the sources of cultural authority – thus becomes 
central. Hotimsky et al. (2006) insist that legitimacy is ‘grounded in actors’ subjective 
orientations and beliefs about what is considered appropriate or morally correct’, while 
Mahoney (2000) observes that the legitimacy of an institution may range from active moral 
approval to passive acquiescence in the face of the status quo. Institutional reproduction then 
rests on a positive feedback process of increasing legitimacy. Institutional change may come 
about as a result of inconsistencies arising between multiple cognitive frameworks that are 
                                                 
8 Hotimsky et al. (2006) use the expression ‘Institutional sociology’, which emphasizes the importance of power and 
legitimacy. These two features are generally used to draw a distinction between SI and HI. The proper existence of SI may 
remain an open question (e.g. Hall and Taylor include Fligstein in SI, while others use these in a historical-institutionalist 
perspective).    Institutions and the environment: the case for a historical political economy 
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dominant in society, providing a basis for actors to adopt new subjective evaluations and 
moral codes concerning appropriateness.   
SI provides improvements over RI in accounting for individual behaviour and collective 
actions, since it emphasizes: 1) the variety of cultural universes and the plurality of 
rationalities/modes of human valuation; 2) that institutions are not only constraints; and 3) 
that the existing world of institutional rules and symbols delineates the range of possibilities 
in terms of institutional creation. But once again two comments are in order: 1) most of these 
approaches are concerned with the relationships between institutions and behaviour; actor’s 
subjective orientations thus play a crucial role. Although the emphasis on  social 
constructivism is attractive, its articulation with the (frequently implicit) dualism within the 
self remains problematic: why would individuals do what is culturally or morally appropriate? 
What explains the genesis of altruism and the sense of justice? 2) The second issue relates to 
institutional change. The latter is conceived as a diachronic form of variety. As Hall and 
Taylor (1996) put it, the approach taken by SI to such processes ‘often seems curiously 
bloodless’, since it overlooks the extent to which processes of institutional production and 
change entail a clash of power among actors with competing interests. Many frames of 
meaning, practices and symbols emerge not only from processes of interpretation but also 
from processes of conflict. The underlying ‘harmony’ – in CE, the purpose of the institution is 
representative of a ‘principle of justice’ and of an ‘altruist’ conception of actors – entails a 
normative bias (Amable and Palombarini, 2005). Poverty in terms of conflict and power 
explains the ‘poverty of history’ (Johnson, 2004). The emphasis on collective legitimacy and 
social appropriateness means that some approaches tend in some contexts to promote a 
deliberative order – e.g. democratic rules that enable the expression of plural views and in 
which consensus is achievable.  
3.3. Historical Institutionalism (HI) 
HI does much to overcome these criticisms. The field of HI includes a number of 
authors – Veblen, Commons – and schools of thought – RT, ‘Variety of Capitalisms’, and 
Social Structures of Accumulation. The definition of an institution does not differ 
significantly from the definition used in SI, although three features of HI are clearly 
distinctive.  
– The ‘raison d’être’ of institutions. RI emphasizes the resolution of problems of 
coordination in the context of strategic interactions. SI emphasizes more generally the 
creation of a legitimized social order. For HI, an institution is essentially a mediation that 
emerges to regulate – rather than to resolve – a social conflict between contradictory interests 
and to institute de facto a new social order (Théret, 2000).   
– Institutional genesis, reproduction and change. While RI, and to a lesser extent SI, 
emphasize the functionalist aspect, HI highlights the role of power, conflicting relationships 
and collective action in the process of institutional creation and change, especially formal 
institutions. Since interests are in conflict, only political compromises between groups enable 
the institutionalization of new rules. These rules allow a temporary stabilization of the conflict 
and structure conflict so as to privilege some interests while demobilizing others. HI thus 
emphasizes the creative role of power and conflicting relationships. Yet none of this implies 
that functions of reduction of uncertainty or cultural referential are thereby denied, since they 
are in fact integrated in a synthetic view which claims that an institution promotes a common 
sense and a symbolical and normative transcendental order (Amable and Palombarini, 2005). 
An institution appears not to be in any way a constraint, but is instead a necessary condition Institutions and the environment: the case for a historical political economy 
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for economic action and the dynamic reproduction of the social order by putting the social 
conflict ‘in brackets’. Indeed, no market activity (which is inherently unstable and uncertain 
in terms of outcomes) would occur without a state law, rules of protection for property rights, 
debt payments and the quality of products... These rules do not constrain markets but are in 
fact its conditions of existence: ‘institutions are collective action in control, liberation and 
expansion of individual action’ (Commons, 1934).  
– Institutions-behaviour relationships. HI tends to conceptualize the relationship between 
institutions and individual behaviour in relatively broad terms since it is based on a 
structuralist holism and focuses more on social structures and organizations (Montalban, 
2008). The idea of rationality is much more difficult to interpret than in SI and RI since it is 
located at the crossroads between instrumental rationality and the concept postulated in SI. As 
socialized individuals, the preferences and behaviours of agents are the product of 
incorporated rules and routines. Culture, values and routines are central. While substantive 
rationality is rejected by HI approaches in economics and economic sociology, the notion of 
interest remains fundamental. For instance, RT is close to Bourdieu’s (1994) conception of 
interest. The calculus and conscious actions are not the general behaviour. The incorporated 
practices, routines and positions of agents in the structure affect the agent’s behaviour and are 
invariably directed towards his own interests: the latter is a social form of the libido which 
Bourdieu refers to as illusio (Lordon, 2006). The interest invariably relates to a particular field 
and merely constitutes that which has value for the agent. HI implies therefore an examination 
of the social conditions of the interest or valuing process. The strategic calculus is limited to 
particular situations and is far less complex than the calculus assumed by neoclassical theory. 
HI argues for an institutionally located rationality (Boyer, 2004): 1) symbolic structures affect 
calculus and the way in which individuals represent their context to themselves; 2) the 
institutional context and the agent’s social position condition his interests; 3) institutions 
synthesise the relevant information. Institutions therefore promote a symbolic sense that 
organizes the systems of values to which agents refer and, thus, their tendency to consider that 
something is or is not of value (Descombes, 1996). An important corollary of the assumption 
of institutionally located rationality is that the objectives and performance criteria of agents 
are only relevant in relation to their social positions and social context. If interests are in 
conflict, there can be no common objective to be achieved, nor can there be any ‘good 
governance’ for this purpose. HI necessarily implies a radical renouncement of any category 
of optimum or efficiency to consider politics as the space of mediation of conflicts and of the 
institutionalisation of social compromises. While performance criteria may constitute fairly 
objective character, they invariably remain social constructs that favour some interests over 
others. The reference to the optimality of an institution is not relevant. What needs to be 
explored is the dynamic stability of institutional arrangements and their contradictions. In this 
sense, HI can be seen as a constructivist and genetic structuralism insofar as it looks for ways 
of taking account of an agent’s subjectivity by replacing it within the objective positions of 
the agent, which means examining: 1) the institutional genesis – the conflict – and resulting 
rules; 2) the agents’ positions in the socio-economic space resulting from the rules and their 
representation in relation to their positions; 3) the conditions of the dynamic reproduction and 
stabilization of the institutional order, i.e. the institutional complementarities and the 
regulation of the system. HI does not aim to provide policy prescriptions – since politics is 
endogenous – or to define ‘optimal’ or ‘just’ institutions. It tends rather to provide agents with 
the intellectual tools that would enable them to direct conflicting relationships to serve their 
own interests by revealing the working logics of domination and the competing working 
interests in institutional orders.  Institutions and the environment: the case for a historical political economy 
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Based on this taxonomy, the positioning of SEE is ambiguous. Clearly, SEE does not 
belong to RI, since it rejects substantive rationality and endorses social constructivism, but it 
is much harder to establish whether it refers to SI or to HI. SEE emphasizes the role of 
conflict and power relations, yet at the same time legitimacy, ethics, and discursive 
institutions are mobilized normatively. There are several contradictions here. First, if we 
assume that power and conflicts are important, it is hard to see why dominant actors would 
accept discursive institutions and plural conceptions of value since they can use power to 
impose their own interests. Furthermore, it is impossible to clarify which conception of value 
will be adopted since no one party is able to force others parties to endorse its own 
conception.  It is therefore  difficult to  understand institutional change (e.g.  the  genesis  of 
another kind of VAI) since we have to assume a consensus between actors, which is in 
conflict with the idea of pluralism. Logically, the only possibility would be that people accept 
a ‘fair’ dialogue, the ‘truth’ and related institutional changes, even if these changes go against 
their own interest… Another problem is that if SEE aims to defend both a normative 
ecological perspective and value pluralism, we may ask why people (especially those in 
dominant positions) would accept the ethical value of Nature and ecology.  The only way of 
avoiding these contradictions is to adopt a ‘pure’ HI and to reject this normative bias 
temporarily. For instance, if we follow Vatn’s assumptions concerning the role of power and 
conflicts in institutional change, it would be more fruitful to use this framework for the 
purposes of analysing institutional change, the construction of political compromises between 
actors, the relative stability of institutional arrangements and their effects on environmental 
and economic outcomes, and then to provide some actors with the intellectual means of 
changing the world rather than promoting institutions prematurely to find the ‘right’ value of 
Nature or the enlightened decision. 
4. Contradiction, conflicts and regulations: fragments of a 
historical institutionalist approach to human-nature 
relationships  
The purpose of this section is to integrate sustainability into a political economy 
approach called Regulation Theory. This work was initiated by Zuindeau (2007), Becker and 
Raza (2000) and by recent studies of the neo-liberalization of nature in geography. Most of 
these studies are reviewed and criticized for the purposes of lending support to an integrative 
historical institutionalist framework by clarifying a number of theoretical and methodological 
issues. This approach develops the concepts of structural-logical contradiction in the use of 
nature for the purposes of commodity production, social conflicts, and the regulation of social 
relations to nature. The resulting methodological basis will be used to outline the scope of an 
applied research program. A central feature is to support both the macro-level and above all 
the meso-level of analysis (production dynamics at the sector level) as the most appropriate 
level for providing an analytical articulation of the various spaces – international, national and 
local – in which political compromises or forms of regulation of social relationships to nature 
are instituted.  
4.1. The structural contradiction between nature and commodity 
production  
The concept of contradiction is employed here in the dialectical sense used by some 
Marxists to analyze the development of capitalism and capitalist crises for the purposes of 
capturing the structural-logical nature of the relationship between capitalism and nature (as 
opposed to the contingent and empirical nature). For O’Connor (1988, 1998), the ecological Institutions and the environment: the case for a historical political economy 
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crisis can be analysed as an external ‘second contradiction of capitalism’.
9
 It is connected 
with the exteriorisation of some costs of social production:
10
 firms have little or no regard for 
the environmental costs of production to society and the biophysical world, even if they 
depend on the under-produced ‘conditions of production’ provided by the biophysical world. 
For O’Connor (1988, p. 26), this is an ‘under-production crisis’, since ecological processes 
are not actively produced and are ‘underpriced’ by the market. O’Connor also argues that ‘we 
can… introduce ‘scarcity’ into the theory of economic crisis in a Marxist way and the 
possibility of capital underproduction once we add up the rising costs of reproducing the 
conditions’. He emphasizes that crises do not arise objectively out of the biophysical problems 
caused by capital: ‘it is a contingent question whether the type and scale of these problems are 
sufficient to generate real or perceived crises among firms, within the state apparatus, or in the 
wider society’.  
The concepts used to analyze this contradiction are criticized by Harribey (2001) and 
Altvater (2003),  who  rightly  observe  that  the  concepts  elaborated  by  Marx  are  themselves 
sufficiently powerful to develop an analysis of the social relations of man with nature and to 
understand ecological issues. For Marx, 1) the reproduction of nature follows quasi-eternal 
natural  laws that  are  radically different from the reproduction of labour and capital; (2) 
capitalism develops the two contradictions jointly, i.e. they are internal to capitalism. In the 
‘Critique of Political Economy’, the analysis of the dual character of commodities is 
fundamental; Marx referred to it as the ‘Springpunkt’, or core question. As Altvater (2007) 
remarks: ‘[t]he use value produced by concrete labor in the production process is nothing else 
than the result of the transformation of matter and energy, i.e. of nature. It is an integral part 
of the human-nature ‘metabolism.’ The [economic] value produced in the valuation process 
by abstract labour however constitutes nothing else than an immaterial social relation in 
capitalism between the capitalist class and the working class’.
11
 This underlies the Marxist 
concept of commodity fetishism. One effect is that the means used by society to achieve its 
qualitative goals become an independent power – which cannot however be reproduced 
without the activity of actors – and all productions of use values are subordinated merely for 
the purposes of yielding a more substantial amount of money. This is precisely what Marx 
(1885, p. 52) meant when he asserted that production is just ‘an unavoidable intermediate 
link, a necessary evil for the sake of money-making’; capital is a form of social organization, 
and its (re)production does not enrich society: ‘Not too much wealth is produced. But at times 
too much wealth is produced in its capitalistic, self-contradictory forms’.  The ‘auto-
movement’ of economic value and capital (1857-8, p. 211) means the fundamental 
indifference of these towards the qualitative features surrounding commodity production. 
Socio-cultural value, biophysical function, and social and environmental consequences do not 
form part of the very social nature of commodities and therefore of the economic process of 
valorization. From this dialectical perspective, ecological and social costs of capital 




                                                 
9 See also Benton (1989) or Leff (1999) for some variations of this concept. The first contradiction to which Marx referred in 
Capital concerns production (overaccumulation) and the difficulty of realisation of surplus value (underconsumption).  
10 In this sense, this understanding is close to Kapp’s (1950) approach in terms of ‘social costs of private enterprise’.  
11 Concrete labours have qualitative differences but on markets all labours count only as productive expenditures ‘of brains, 
muscles, nerves, hands, etc.’ (Marx, 1967), i.e. count only as abstract labour. Economic value (exchange value being ‘its 
form of appearance’) amounts to a ‘mere concretisation of human labour, as the expenditure of equal human labor-power.’ 
(Marx; 1880, p. 1550) whose sensible form is a quantity of money serving to enlarge capital. 
12 I have argued elsewhere that this supports a systematic non-market conception of natural wealth (Douai, 2009), which is 
the main analytical purpose of SEE. Moreover, I do not argue that there is a ‘full’ ecology of Marx. Marx did not anticipate 
the global ecological crisis. While he had ‘a clear understanding of the basic contradiction between the potentially unlimited Institutions and the environment: the case for a historical political economy 
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At this stage two important remarks are in order: 
– The fundamental mediations between humans and nature in capitalism. The basic 
standpoint of this paper is that all human activities simultaneously imply two levels: 1) the 
relation between man and nature; 2) the relation between humans themselves. Commons 
(1934, p. 651) identifies the distinctive characteristic of [historical] institutionalism: ‘The 
classic and hedonic economists… founded their theories on the relation of man to nature, but 
institutionalism is a relation of man to man’. Capital accumulation can be seen as the more 
abstract expression of the fundamental mediations between humans and nature. This process 
is based on historical-concrete forms, the logical sequence of which begins with property 
rights, human labour and ends with money. Marx saw human labour as a trans-historical 
mediation between humans and nature, and also postulated the logical precedence of property 
in general. Yet what interested him were the historical forms taken by these processes: wage 
labour and capitalist property right (CPR). Commons (1931, 1934) provided an in-depth 
analysis of the CPR, defined as a ‘right on future values’ in relation to ‘intangible property’. 
Its analytical primacy is emphasized: ‘it is society that controls access to the forces of nature, 
and transactions are not the ‘exchange of commodities’, but the alienation and acquisition, 
between individuals, of the rights of property and liberty created by society, which must 
therefore be negotiated between the parties concerned before labour can produce, consumers 
can consume, commodities be physically exchanged’. A property right mediates the relations 
between man and nature; its forms are historically variable and it is the product of social 
conflict/political struggles, and thus an instituted compromise about wealth and resource-use 
conflicts. By drawing a distinction between its three main attributes – usus,  fructus and 
abusus – and between ‘tangible’ and ‘intangible’ property, Commons insisted that while 
‘tangible property’ refers to the possibility of using a good to produce wealth, ‘intangible 
property’ helps to achieve the power of negotiation and the power of creating an artificial 
scarcity by limiting supply with the aim of earning money. These comments are merely 
designed to give more substance to the suggestions made by Vatn (2005b, p. 14): ‘Institutions 
structure the relation[s] between humans as they utilize their common natural resource base. 
Today many of these relations are governed by an institutional structure called ‘markets’’. 
Property, wage and monetary relations need to figure prominently in investigations into the 
connection between political economy and ecological issues.  
– From latent contradictions to social conflicts as visible challenges. The account of the 
structural contradiction between the use of nature and commodity production does not imply 
that there is a kind of inherent mechanism that produces crises or social conflicts. The 
contradiction of the value form provides only the abstract possibility for crisis, but it cannot 
account for any single empirical crisis and its complex social-political origins. Altvater (1993, 
p. 215) and Bridge (2000, p. 239) rightly highlight the analytical power of this distinction. On 
the one hand, it is possible to recognize that not all social conflicts over nature are expressive 
of this contradiction. On the other hand, by acknowledging that the structural-logical 
contradiction is not invariably expressed through open conflict, it is possible to study the 
social-political mechanisms regulating contradictions over time and space.
13
  
                                                                                                                                                         
character of value accumulation and the limited character of some natural resources, especially the soil… he did not explore 
the consequences of this for nature in general. But [if this] may be seen as a weakness, this is because the conceptual 
framework he elaborated could well have led him to anticipate the ecological crisis’ (Tanuro, 2007).  
13 Bridge (2000, p. 240) argues that O’Connor ‘reduce[s] social context to the status of shadow-lands surrounding capital’ 
rather ‘than promoting a socialized account of contradiction’. In fact, for O’Connor crises cannot arise without the interplay 
of social and geographical contingencies. Altvater (2003, p. 14) writes: ‘The discourse on general conditions of production is 
a politicised one because the state, the political system and the power structure of a given society… are involved. J. Institutions and the environment: the case for a historical political economy 
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4.2. From contradiction to the regulation of social relationships to 
nature 
The aim of this subsection is to develop the concept of regulation of social relationships 
to nature (RSRN) and to show how its articulation with theoretical and methodological tools 
of RT provides a fruitful framework for studying the relations between socio-economic 
processes and ecological questions, i.e. for examining the role of nature and sustainability in the 
transformation of accumulation process, and its social and ecological outcomes. 
RT emerged 30 years ago as an alternative both to equilibrium-based neoclassical 
theories and to the a-dynamical/a-contextual dimensions of structuralist accounts of capitalist 
development. Its core focus  is  to provide  an  account of the paradoxical  perseverance of 
capitalist modes of production (MP) in spite of a number of immanent contradictions – which 
concern essentially two ‘fundamental relations’: 1) the market relation between separated 
though interdependent producers of commodity; 2) the wage-labour relation. To this end, 
regulationists have sought to integrate the technical and organizational features of productive 
processes  with  socio-political  relations  of  capitalist  reproduction (see Jessop, 1995). They 
argue that  these  socio-political  relations  codified  as institutions can regulate periods of 
macroeconomic growth by providing coherence to production processes (Boyer, 1990). RT 
specifies different periods of growth conceived as different ‘regimes of accumulation’ (RA). 
An RA is a standard scheme of capital accumulation that has to be supported and ‘steered’ by 
modes of regulation (MR), i.e. ‘the set of procedures and individual and collective 
behaviours’ that also ‘[r]eproduce fundamental social relations through the mode of 
production in combination with historically determined institutional forms [and] [e]nsure the 
compatibility over time of a set of decentralised decisions,  without  the  economic actors 
themselves having to internalise the adjustment principles governing the overall system’ (p. 
43). The key concepts of RA and MR are connected at the macro-level of historical 
institutional configurations with given forms of accumulation – a connection captured by the 
concept of ‘mode of development’ (MD). The framework used to analyze national experiences 
in  the mid term retains  five  institutional  forms,  i.e.  a  specific  codification of fundamental 
capitalist social relationships resulting from social conflicts and compromises themselves 
dependent on the country’s political history: forms of competition, the configurations of the 
wage-labour nexus, monetary regime, insertion in the international regime and nature of the 
state.  
RT focuses primarily on the macro level, by combining synchronic and diachronic 
analyses for the purposes of studying the temporal and spatial variability of institutional forms 
and the manner in which these forms mediate contradictions arising from the wage relation. 
However, other levels are also under consideration, especially the level of the firm. The aim is 
to study the diversity of modes of organisation in firms in connection with the analysis of the 
different forms of capitalism, in other words by articulating these modes with their 
institutional context – at the macro-level, but also at the meso-level (sector dynamics) which 
remains the principal arena of the institutionalisation of the compromises structuring 
competition (Lung, 2008) within an institutional order, to use the phrase coined by Jullien 
and Smith (2008). In any field of application, two points are emphasized: 1) the importance of 
considering  institutional complementarity, i.e. when the marginal efficiency of a certain 
institution is positively related to the presence or intensity of another institution in another 
area (and vice versa), or when the presence of an institutional form in one area results in the 
                                                                                                                                                         
O’Connor is very clear with regard to the politicisation of discourses on general conditions of production’. O’Connor (1988, 
p. 37) writes: ‘[I]ssues pertaining to production conditions are class issues, even though they are also more than class issues’.  Institutions and the environment: the case for a historical political economy 
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adoption of an institutional form in another area (Amable and Palombarini, 2005); and 2) the 
central role of conflicts of interests, power accumulation and political mediations in 
explaining institutional change, as Figure 2 illustrates. Figure 2 also provides a summary of a 
number of features identified above concerning institutions and institutional change.   
 
Figure 2. Institutions and change (inspired from Amable and Palombarini, 2005) 
 
 
The integration of the concept of regulations of social relations to nature (RSRN) 
implies to consider the inherent contradiction between the use of nature for commodity 
production and their specific codifications, which has yet to be considered by RT. This 
perspective is implicit in Zuindeau (2007) and Becker and Raza (2000). For Zuindeau (2007), 
‘economic  relationships  to  the environment’ take on a ‘general capitalist form’, and a 
‘capitalist-specific form’, implying a diversity of modes of management of environmental 
problems’ (p. 297). However, Zuindeau focuses exclusively on the articulations of capitalist-
specific forms of relations to the environment with institutional forms, i.e. the ex post 
coherence of MR (institutional complementarity of institutional forms). Yet he provides no 
analysis of the process of institutionalisation of these relationships, thus focusing on what is 
institutionalized without examining the process of institutionalization. We argue that without 
rejecting the work of Zuindeau, this field merits further analysis since these processes 
represent two steps of the same approach. The same remark applies to Becker and Raza 
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(2000) or Rousseau (2000), who conceptualize the relationship between the economy and 
environment as the ‘sixth structural [institutional] form’: since the material world constitutes a 
constraining  factor  of  capitalist  production like money, it could also be referred to as an 
‘ecological constraint’, a form that ‘regulates access to and utilization of the material both for 
production and reproduction activities’. Becker and Raza (2000, p. 321) argue that ‘[b]ecause 
of its complexity, it does not seem appropriate to subsume ecological regulation under any 
one of the five structural forms defined by RT’.  
Our aim is not to discuss the relevance of introducing a sixth institutional form, since 
this would imply an excessive focus on macroeconomic questions at the expense of a more 
relevant analytical focus on the institutionalization of ecological regulations. However, we use 
the definition of an ‘ecological constraint’ for defining the concept of RSRN: RSRN is the 
entire set of regulations that governs the access to natural resources and the use of the 
material world of the activities of (re)-production and the regulations governing the spatial 
and temporal distribution of their costs and benefits. In our view, this definition covers all the 
institutions and transactions that codify the fundamental social relations of capitalism, since 
such relations are at the same time relations to nature. In others words, the regulation of 
fundamental social relationships needs to be understood as a RSRN: an MR is also an RSRN. 
An RSRN cannot therefore be reduced to explicit environmental policies: all institutional 
forms structure the RSRN. Of course, a distinction needs to be drawn between regulations, 
which are based explicitly on the political issue of ecology, and those dimensions that are not 
based on this issue. Before conceptualizing the sixth institutional form, it is important to 
conceptualize these rules as regulations of crises and conflicts – the expression of capitalist 
relationships. 
Two types of questions can be inferred from this theoretical position.  
1) First, to avoid an exclusive focus on explicit environmental policies and to avoid 
overlooking other levels of regulations, we have to consider the analysis of the ‘political 
work’ of actors (Jullien and Smith, 2008) designed to influence environmental policies. The 
crucial point here is the capacity of actors to prevail over other interests, or as Brand and Görg 
(2001, p. 94) put it, ‘to be hegemonic, in the sense of the capacity to win other actors to accept 
a compromise’. This is absolutely essential for understanding and illustrating the ways in 
which ecological problems emerge as social-political issues, and the ways in which EG rules 
are created as political compromises between competing actors, i.e. exchanges of reciprocal 
concessions between contradictory interests, crystallising temporarily a power relationship 
rather than a consensus on values concerning different conceptions of justice. The dominant 
social relationships with nature result in the emergence of overt conflicts or multi-level social-
political issues that are never  merely based  on  biological/biophysical necessities or  on  the 
shaping of socio-cultural institutions that reflect an enlightened viewpoint or an ethical stance, 
but that are a matter of political work that may lead, for instance, to the establishment of new 
markets. EG rules are not merely about ‘constraints’ concerning capital accumulation, but may 
also be seen as political opportunities for actors to get the dominant position according to 
their interests within the relevant social field. 
2) In most cases, the conflicts and crises that emerge as a result of a process of 
politicisation based on ecological concerns assume, at all levels, the contestation of the 
prevailing political compromises sustaining RA. It is therefore necessary to examine how the 
regulation of conflicts transforms political compromises by favouring the interests of some 
actors to the detriment of others. This is not to say that the concrete content of ecological 
problems or the implications of formal rules in terms of social and environmental outcomes 
have to be ignored. But these elements have first to be inscribed into and articulated within an Institutions and the environment: the case for a historical political economy 
24 
 
analysis of conflicts – at all geographical levels – and the inherent divergent interests and 
power relations, which occur as a new MD is in the process of taking shape. The concept of 
RSRN is used to overcome the exclusive focus (from SEE in  particular  though not 
exclusively) either on the objective ecological requirements or on the ethically valid procedures 
and individual behaviours, or on explicit institutional rules, that ultimately ignore (and indeed 
sometimes negate) the wider social context in which the political work of actors with 
divergent interests performs, from the heuristic point of view, the primary role in concrete 
practice and trajectories. This standpoint has the (perhaps unpleasant) consequence that 
sustainability can no longer be viewed as an objective model revealed to the various actors as 
soon as they are inserted into the appropriate value articulating [forming] institutions, or as a 
process of re-embedding the economy within society and nature driven by a unifying 
movement of self-protection against the destructive effects of liberated markets. Sustainability 
is an arena of social-political conflicts: it needs to be conceptualized as part of the open 
process of restructuring the regulation of the accumulation process within countries, regions 
and worldwide.  
4.3. The political arenas of sustainability  
As noted above in the case of RSRN, the political arenas of sustainability include a 
large number of institutions. Yet a problem is not by essence political: it becomes political 
only after a process of politicisation implying a political work of actors. The same principle 
applies to sustainability. An analytical grid of institutional change is thus required. For RT, 
institutional change is linked to conflicts and crises. Here a distinction is therefore required 
between two types of ecological conflicts, corresponding to two types of crises: ecological-
economic and social-political.  
In the case of ecological-economic crises, the existing institutional framework is no 
longer viable in the sense that it fails to contain (in the sense of responsibly ensuring the 
pacific co-existence of structural contradictions and of the accumulation process) the 
structural contradictions that arise from the capitalist depletion of ecological resources and 
conditions, and which threaten ‘capital’s own conditions, hence its own profits and capacity to 
produce and accumulate more capital’ (O’Connor, 1988, p. 25). Such is the case for instance 
of industries based on the extraction and exploitation of natural resources. We may also think 
of a crisis as causing growing costs for capital and decreasing profit rates. Note that this can 
be a macroeconomic crisis (crisis of RA) or a sectoral crisis. An ecological-economic crisis 
may result in a social-political crisis. 
In the case of social-political crises, the existing institutional framework is obsolete 
since the ecological impact of production processes threatens the social-political compromises 
that had previously upheld economic activity and the interests of the groups constitutive of the 
hegemonic bloc. Such a crisis assumes that actors are engaged in explicit political work with a 
view to contesting the prevailing political compromises. We may consider the local impacts 
of rejections or global impacts that may threaten a sector or some classes which will then 
contest the political compromise and make the conflict fully visible. 
An analysis of institutional change could be carried out at international/national, 
sectoral, or local scales. This is a workable classification, but is it also at least partly artificial. 
At the macro-level, the issue is to study how political crises and changes of hegemonic blocs 
transform the RSRN and MR, which could imply isolating, for practical reasons, an 
institutional domain/form dedicated to environmental issues. Indeed, political compromises 
are not merely structured by environmental issues. At the meso-level (sector), the Institutions and the environment: the case for a historical political economy 
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understanding of the institutionalisation of RSRN implies to examine, through an analysis of 
concrete political work, the divergent interests of actors (firms, consumers, employees…) and 
the way in which such compromises are institutionalized. This approach will thus help:  
(1) to avoid the isolation of environmental conflicts from others conflicts; 
(2) to avoid the question of the sixth institutional form; 
(3) to analyse the effects of institutional changes on the economic and environmental 
performances of industries; 
(4) to analyse the process of submission vs. autonomization of sectors from global 
political constraints; 
(5) to highlight how the macro-level is influenced by institutional changes at the meso-
level and vice versa. 
While the RSRN encompasses all of the MR, some regulations may nonetheless be 
viewed as being explicitly ecological, in the sense that the rules are institutionalized following 
a process of politicization of environmental questions and the regulation of environmental 
conflicts connected with the environmental effects of accumulation. These working rules 
control the transactions with the ethical aim of achieving a given environmental target, 
considered as a “good”, following conflicts and their legal institutionalization. We may then 
build a taxonomy  of  what  Zuindeau (2007) calls “management’s modes of environmental 
problems”. Markets, norms and taxes are often opposed. The problem here is that there tends 
to be a confusion between transactions and the working rules controlling transactions. Yet for 
Commons  (1931,  1934),  the  three  types  of  transactions (bargaining transactions, managing 
transactions and rationing transactions) are in fact regulated by law and ethics. It is more 
useful to oppose transactions: first of all, norms are not in any way opposed to markets since 
they are institutions that are designed to regulate bargaining transactions (e.g. markets of 
polluting rights are created by norms, laws and States; quality standards enable markets to 
function…) and managing transactions (the norms of production). These norms are sometimes 
customs, when they are not formalized through laws, and are sometimes working rules of laws 
when they are formalized. Yet taxes, conceived as tools, are opposed to markets: the former 
constitute rationing transactions, while the latter are bargaining transactions. But both cases 
invariably imply a property right transfer: for instance, a tax is the payment of an ecological 
debt by a polluter, since the latter borrows part of nature from society through a transfer of 
incorporeal property, which is then reimbursed by tax. Bargaining transactions involve a 
transfer of intangible property from an individual to another individual, which assumes a 
transformation of Nature in capitalist assets. Moreover, the norms aimed at creating incentives 
to adopt “green” technologies or production processes (extended producer responsibility) are 
working rules designed to regulate managing transactions. Finally, some rules organize the 
transactions of corporeal property that may be bargaining, managing or rationing transactions 
(such as the use rights of a park belonging to a community, or the simple purchase of a piece 
of land). Following Billaudot (2005), we may consider that each transaction is based on some 
types of justifications or on ethical grounds (liberty for bargaining transaction, efficiency for 
managing, order/equality for rationing), and different types of justifications are available to 
concrete forms of RSRN and models of capitalism. A more relevant taxonomy of models of 
capitalism could be built on the basis of such concepts. Yet as Pascal remarked, such 
justifications constitute merely a justification of power.  
Analysis of institutional change needs to be articulated with an analysis of structural 
coherence of MR and RA at the macro-level, or of the coherence of industry at the industrial 
level. We could then carry out a diachronic and synchronic analysis of the variety of Institutions and the environment: the case for a historical political economy 
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environmental trajectories of MD, which, connected with an analysis of institutionalization, 
would help to gain a deeper understanding of the degree of stability and sustainability of the 
models (e.g. “cognitive” accumulation regime to manage ecological crises? “hedonist” 
regime?). The study of international regimes and agreements connected with the variety of 
MD is another potential field of investigation. This last point could be fruitfully studied from 
a meso-economic point of view since: 
(1) the sectors that suffer from a crisis (ecological-economic or social-political) and those 
that cause a crisis have conflicting interests; 
(2) but they can also shape the macro-regulation since many political issues can be 
appropriated at the sector level; 
(3) sectors can be regulated at transnational levels; 
(4) It allows for a “closer”, in-depth analysis of the institutionalization of environmental 
policies, the conflicts of actors and their interactions with the economy and the macro-
level (e.g. conflicts linked to access to resources in water, oil, fish; conflicts linked to the 
appropriation of  natural resources  through genetically modified organisms; effects of 
ecological and energy crises on the automobile industry…). 
5. Concluding remarks  
The adoption of a socio-economic approach to the environment and sustainability is 
surely the most promising avenue for developing a credible and comprehensive alternative to 
standard analysis. The (dominant) ethical-based approach presents some serious shortcomings 
that stem essentially from the same root: the absence of any clear divide between normative 
and descriptive claims. It is therefore impossible to draw a clear distinction between politics 
and ethics, and between social science and moral philosophy. The underlying conception of 
social mediation between humans and nature is based on a complex methodological 
individualism: environmental issues are related to a matter of individual ethical commitment, 
to the context in which actors are free to make identity choices. The tension – sometimes 
envisaged – between this view and real social relations with nature cannot be taken into 
account. Consequently, this approach cannot (begin to) explore the interrelations between 
environmental issues and socio-economic dynamics.  
This paper proposes some guidelines in this direction. The core principles of the 
historical-institutionalist approach are as follows: ecological crises or conflicts must first be 
included in an analysis of global, national and local social conflicts, and of the opposing 
interests and power relations that are inherent within them, which are currently in view as a 
result of the emergence of a post-Fordist mode of development. The questions to be asked 
include how institutions change, how these appear to actors to constitute an objective 
constraint, and which interests and strategies tend to prevail (Brand and Görg, 2001). 
Sustainability can be seen as the exacerbation of contradictions inherent in the dominant 
social relationships with nature. It marks a reform project within the framework of an open 
process of searching for novel, stabilized compromises to overcome the crisis of Fordism. The 
concept has now become an integral part of post-Fordist restructuring within individual 
countries and at a global level, and no longer represents a particular approach for overcoming 
the socioeconomic and ecological crises, but is itself an element of the conflicts that are 
currently being fought out over the regulation of social relations. In practical terms, an 
analysis of the different modes of development and their sustainability should lead us to 
consider the various uses of this concept as ethical justifications that conceal actors’ interests, 
since, to quote Pascal, ‘being unable to make what is just strong, we have made what is strong 
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